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Emotion plays a critical role in many contemporary accounts of decision making, but exactly what underlies
its influence and how this is mediated in the brain remain far from clear. Here, we review behavioral studies
that suggest that Pavlovian processes can exert an important influence over choice and may account for
many effects that have traditionally been attributed to emotion. We illustrate how recent experiments cast
light on the underlying structure of Pavlovian control and argue that generally this influencemakes good com-
putational sense. Corresponding neuroscientific data from both animals and humans implicate a central role
for the amygdala through interactionswith other brain areas. This yields a neurobiological account of emotion
in which it may operate, often covertly, to optimize rather than corrupt economic choice.Introduction
The disregard that human choice frequently pays to the axioms
of formal decision theory has placed a high premium on develop-
ing a biological understanding of the structure that underlies it.
Researchers from behavioral economics, finance, marketing,
and politics are now looking to neuroscience to provide insights
into the peculiarities of choice that often plague their own do-
mains. Reliance on a traditional two-system model, in which
a ‘‘cold,’’ rational, far-sighted cognitive system battles against
a ‘‘hot,’’ irrational, short-sighted emotional system (Camerer
et al., 2005; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002;Sloman, 1996), is
beginning to prove inadequate in light of contemporary psycho-
logical and neurobiological data that favor multiple decision-sys-
tems (Figure 1). The latter perspective promises a more mecha-
nistic account of decision making but leaves open the question
of exactly what was captured by traditional concepts of an emo-
tional system, this having provided such an enduring repository
for the various anomalies that have proved problematic to ac-
commodate.
The brain structure most commonly affiliated with emotion is
the amygdala, predominantly due to itswidely studied role in Pav-
lovian (classical) conditioning. Indeed, the acquisition of innate
value and responding in Pavlovian paradigms plays a central
role in most standard neurobiological accounts of emotion (Do-
lan, 2002; LeDoux, 2000a; Rolls, 1998). However, recent animal
and human studies suggest that the amygdala may also play an
important role in guiding choice. Understanding how these two
aspects of amygdala function canbe integrated focusesattention
on experimental studies that suggest that the information ac-
quired in Pavlovian learning might guide more sophisticated ac-
tion-selection processes underlying decisions. Here, we review
evidence, which draws strongly on studies of Pavlovian-instru-
mental interactions, that addresses this more elaborate role for
the amygdala. The resulting decision phenotype is typically emo-
tional but arises from underlying processes that are generally ra-
tional and whose effects might often only become apparent in in-
stances when they cause deviations from rationality.
We begin by reviewing the nature of Pavlovian conditioning, in
which we consider both the innate responses it evokes and the662 Neuron 58, June 12, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.type of information it learns, which embodies the notion of Pav-
lovian (both appetitive and aversive) value. We then show how
several key experimental paradigms illustrate how other (instru-
mental) action systems can exploit this information to refine their
own performance. By addressing theoretical considerations, we
illustrate that these processes may often maximize the use of
information acquired through different learning mechanisms to
optimize choice. We then review the experimental evidence in
animals that implicates the amygdala in the control of many of
these aspects of decision making. Finally, concentrating on de-
cision making in humans, we draw parallels with results from be-
havioral economics that might be understood in terms of these
underlying, amygdala-dependent processes.
Pavlovian Learning
Pavlovian learning provides a unique means to learn the motiva-
tional landscape of the environment, by coupling experience-
based statistical learning with the wisdom of species-wide evo-
lutionary inheritance. In the classic experimental paradigm,
a neutral cue, such as switching on a light, reliably precedes
an important event, such as the arrival of food. Learning the pre-
dictive relationship between the two events has two key conse-
quences. First, it allows an appropriate response to be evoked in
anticipation of the outcome, such as approach and salivation.
Second, it endows the otherwise uninteresting cue with acquired
motivational value, reflecting the utility of the net reward or pun-
ishment that it predicts. As we shall discuss, this value turns out
to be a very useful quantity that can be adaptively exploited by
other decision-making systems, particularly when facedwith po-
tentially complex choices.
Pavlovian Responses
Konorski (1967) first formalized the types of action evoked when
animals are faced with a motivationally salient event (uncondi-
tioned stimulus) or a cue predictive of a salient event (condi-
tioned stimulus). He classified actions into those specific to the
identity of the outcome, termed ‘‘consummatory responses,’’
such as salivating when faced with foods, and those more gen-
erally appropriate to the valence of the outcome, such as ap-
proach and withdrawal, termed ‘‘preparatory responses.’’
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makes sense to approach food and salivate in anticipation of
eating it, and itmakes sense towithdrawwhen seeing a predator.
Pavlovian conditioning allows these apparently hardwired re-
sponses to be elicited as soon as a prediction is reliably made.
In this way, Pavlovian responses reflect a base set of evolution-
arily inherited hardwired actions, remarkably, though not exclu-
sively (Bolles, 1970), conserved across species.
Accordingly, situations in which Pavlovian actions are inap-
propriate often reflect either a change in environment that is
out of pace with evolution or the mischievous paradigms of ex-
perimental psychologists. The former is best illustrated by over-
eating in humans. The abundance of food in many modern soci-
eties renders the beneficial effect of a feeding system that
Figure 1. How Many Action Systems?
Consider the problem of learning to find the food in the maze above. First, the
simplest solution utilizes Pavlovian conditioning and exploits innate actions
such as approach and withdrawal. During Pavlovian conditioning, positions
that are associated with the outcome acquire a positive value that causes
the agent to approach them. Thus, following the tendency to approach the re-
ward from position d, d will acquire a positive utility, causing it to be ap-
proached from other positions, including c. Through sequential conditioning,
the individual can potentially navigate relying purely on the Pavlovian ap-
proach.
Second, habits involve the learning of action utilities. Trial and error will reveal
that turning right at d is immediately profitable, and the reward can be used di-
rectly to reinforce the action. Learning the preceding actions, such as what to
do at position b, is more difficult, because the outcomes are both delayed and
contingent on subsequent actions (the credit assignment problem; Bellman,
1957). One possibility is to use either the subsequently available best action
utility (as in Q learning; Watkins and Dayan, 1992) or the subsequent Pavlovian
state values (as in Actor-Critic learning; Barto, 1995) as a surrogate reward in-
dicator. This has the effect of propagating (or ‘‘bootstrapping’’) action utilities
to increasing distances in chains of actions.
Third, goal-directed learningmechanisms overcome the lack of an explicit rep-
resentation of the structure of the environment or of the utility of a goal in Pav-
lovian actions and habits by involving a model of some sort. Indeed, there may
be more than one distinct form of model-based decision system (Yoshida and
Ishii, 2006). A natural form is a map of the area within which one’s own position
and the position of the goal can be specified, in which the structure of the
model is governed by the two-dimensional physical nature of the environment.
Alternatively, propositional models, which have a less-constrained prior struc-
ture, might specify actions as bringing about transitions between uniquely
identified positional states. Such models bear a closer relation to linguistic
mechanisms, for instance taking the form of ‘‘from the starting position, go
left, left again, then right, and then right again,’’ and in theory have the capacity
to incorporate complex sets of state-action rules.
Fourth, and finally, control might also be guided by discrete episodicmemories
of previous reinforcement. Such a controller is based on explicit recall of pre-
vious episodes and has been suggested to guide actions in the very earliest of
trials (Lengyel and Dayan, 2007).evolved in much sparser environments inappropriate in light of
known health sequelae of excessive eating. However, a goal-di-
rected action system that can exploit this explicit knowledge
struggles to compete with its Pavlovian counterpart and inWest-
ern societies may have contributed to an epidemic of obesity. In-
deed, the only ‘‘cure’’ for such Pavlovian gluttony may itself be
Pavlovian, insofar as contingently pairing nausea and vomiting
with food results in a food aversion capable of inhibiting Pavlov-
ian compulsion but, unfortunately, only if food is relatively novel
(Best and Gemberling, 1977).
More spectacular examples of Pavlovian ‘‘impulsivity’’ exist in
the experimental domain (Dayan et al., 2006). In his famous ex-
periment, Hershberger (1986) placed chicks in front of a food
cart and arranged the cart to move in the same direction as the
chick, but at twice the speed. Consequently, approaching the
cart caused it to retreat at twice the speed, but retreating from
the cart causes it to approach the chick. Chicks’ inability to learn
to move away from the cart can be explained by the dominance
of a preparatory Pavlovian impulse to approach it over an instru-
mental ability to learn to retreat and obtain the food.
In a broader sense, Pavlovian actions reflect the sorts of ac-
tions that evolution prescribes as almost invariably appropriate.
Indeed, in the aversive domain in particular, responses such as in
freeze and flight in situations of threat may clearly be life saving.
In isolation, such responses reflect decisions in their own right. In
terms of optimal control, they can be thought of as a set of action
priors, over and above which instrumental systemsmay operate.
In the situations in which such decisions are inappropriate, the
resulting competition between other action systems is manifest
as instances of impulsivity or failed self control.
Pavlovian Values
Beyond basic responses, Pavlovian learning provides a mecha-
nism by which the predictive value of a cue or state can be
learned. This ‘‘value’’ reflects the sum of rewards and punish-
ments expected to occur from a given point in the environment,
yielding information that has potential uses beyond directing
Pavlovian ‘‘actions.’’ Accordingly, experimental psychologists
have developed several ingenious learning paradigms that illus-
trate just how Pavlovian values are exploited by other systems
(Figure 2) (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002; Mackintosh, 1983).
In the paradigm termed ‘‘conditioned reinforcement,’’ an ani-
mal is first taught the Pavlovian contingency between a cue
and a reward (Fantino, 1977; Hyde, 1976). Subsequently, it is
then exposed to the instrumental contingency between an ac-
tion, such as a lever press, and the cue. Even though the cue
is presented entirely in extinction, allowing no direct instrumental
learning of the reward that it previously predicted, the animal will
start to press to the lever, indicating critically that the acquisition
of Pavlovian value by the cue is, alone, able to reinforce instru-
mental action systems.
A slightly more complex illustration of Pavlovian-instrumental
cooperation is seen in avoidance learning, in which it deals
with the problem of how to reinforce actions that lead to appar-
ently neutral outcomes (which represent instances of successful
avoidance) (Mowrer, 1947). Specifically, Pavlovian fear mecha-
nisms are thought to motivate escape responses when a punish-
ment is predicted, and subsequent avoidance is driven by appe-
titive reinforcement of the state that marks the safety ofNeuron 58, June 12, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 663
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Learning and Their Interactions
(A) Pavlovian conditioning. Repeated sequential
presentations of a cue (light) followed by a reward
(chocolate) allow an individual to learn that the cue
predicts the reward.
(B) Instrumental conditioning (action learning). An
individual learns that action 1 (for example, press-
ing a button) leads to delivery of a particular reward
(chocolate). This reinforces the action whenever it
becomes available. A different action (for example,
spinning a wheel) leads to delivery of a different re-
ward (a refreshing drink), which reinforces action 2.
(C)Pavlovian-instrumental interactions.ThePavlov-
ian cue (light) is sometimes presentedwhen various
actions are available. This will reinforce any action
seems to lead to delivery of the cue (conditioned re-
inforcement) labeled (a), all other reward-predicting
actions (actions 1 and 2, general Pavlovian-instru-
mental transfer) labeled (b), chocolate-associated
actions (action 1, specific Pavlovian-instrumental
transfer) labeled (c), or approach responses (Pav-
lovian conditioned responses) labeled (d).successful avoidance, which has the form of a Pavlovian condi-
tioned inhibitor (a Pavlovian cue that predicts the omission of
punishment) (Bolles andGrossen, 1969; Bouton, 2006; Crawford
et al., 1977; Damato et al., 1968; Dickinson, 1980; Dinsmoor,
2001; Starr and Mineka, 1977). In this case, it is the Pavlovian
conditioned inhibitor that adopts the role of conditioned rein-
forcer.
Pavlovian values can also influence actions in a slightly subtler
way. In Pavlovian-instrumental transfer, a Pavlovian cue is first
trained to passively predict a particular reward. Next, the individ-
ual is trained on an instrumental learning paradigm, such as a
lever-press, for either the same or different reward. Finally, the
Pavlovian cue is presented at the same time as the instrumental
behavior, usually in extinction. In both animals and humans, the
appetitive Pavlovian cue increases the rate of instrumental appe-
titive responding, independently of the identity of the reward, re-
flecting a general increase in response vigor (general Pavlovian-
instrumental transfer) (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002; Estes,
1948; Lovibond, 1983). And in a similar manner, an aversive
cue will reduce responding (conditioned suppression) (Digiusto
et al., 1974; Estes and Skinner, 1941). However, it turns out
that Pavlovian values can be integrated more selectively with
choice, illustrated by specific reinforcer effects in transfer para-
digms. For example, if an animal that is both hungry and thirsty is
able to perform separate actions to obtain food or water, a Pav-
lovian cue previously associated with food will increase the num-
ber of times the animal selects the food-related action. Alterna-
tively, if the individual is sated for one or other reward (i.e., is
allowed to drink or eat freely), then the transfer effect is appropri-
ately directed at the nonconsumed reward (Balleine, 2001).
In humans, it seems likely that many everyday emotional in-
fluences on decision making may be related to phenomena
captured in the experimental paradigms developed by animal
learning theorists (Phelps and LeDoux, 2005), evidenced for in-
stance by the success of marketing and advertising campaigns
that exploit passive, emotionally laden cues. More directly,
overeating in the context of appetitive cues has clear parallels
with conditioned potentiation (Holland and Petrovich, 2005)
(see below). Addictive and compulsive behavior is thought to664 Neuron 58, June 12, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.be strongly related to conditioned reinforcement and Pavlov-
ian-instrumental transfer (Everitt and Robbins, 2005). In behav-
ioral economics, so-called ‘‘framing’’ effects, in which the emo-
tional valence of the language in which options are described
dramatically changes people’s risk preferences (Kahneman
and Tversky, 2000; McNeil et al., 1982), resemble the effects
seen in transfer paradigms (De Martino et al., 2006). Further-
more, people’s tendencies to overvalue losses in comparison
to gains, apparent in loss aversion, has been suggested to be
related to the dominance of automatic responses to losses (Ca-
merer, 2005; Trepel et al., 2005). And in a further example from
behavioral economics, the ‘‘hot stove’’ effect, which describes
the bias away from collecting information (such as about the
temperature of stoves) about previous events with aversive
consequences, is a direct parallel to the avoidance ‘‘paradox’’
(Denrell and March, 2001).
Theoretical Aspects of Pavlovian Control
Insight into the importance of Pavlovian interactions can be
gained by considering the type of information that Pavlovian
values carry. Allowing assumptions about temporal discounting,
Pavlovian cues provide an indication of the average amount of
reinforcement available at a given time, which turns out to be
a potentially very useful signal. First, it provides a standard
against which individual actions should be judged. For example,
receiving £5 is positive in a neutral context, but negative in the
context of cues that suggest that an average outcome should
be £10. In terms of choice, this may change the relative utilities
of available options for individuals with nonlinear utility functions.
Butmore importantly, it may change the values of actions as they
are acquired through learning. Learning how much better or
worse the value of a current state is before and after taking a par-
ticular action, rather than directly learning absolute action
values, proves to be a much more efficient way of learning opti-
mal actions in situations in which Pavlovian state values are
known with greater relative certainty. Indeed, using state-based
values to learn action values is central to several popular learning
rules, notably the actor-critic and advantage learning models,
which have modest biological support (Baird, 1993; Dayan and
Balleine, 2002; O’Doherty et al., 2004).
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ing by controlling exploration. Exploration is critical in environ-
ments when the outcomes of actions are either not known with
certainty or change over time. The strategy used for exploration
has an important effect on apparent risk attitudes (Denrell, 2007;
March, 1996; Niv et al., 2002). This is because if the value of an
action is uncertain then the relative value of an outcome deter-
mines the frequency with which it is sampled: an option judged
aversive will be tried less often than one judged positive. Thus,
Pavlovian values can modify asymmetrical sampling biases
that arise between positive and negative or high versus low var-
iance outcomes.
Third, in addition to judgments of relative utility, Pavlovian
values can also usefully inform how much effort an individual
should invest in a set of actions. This notion embodies the con-
cepts of excitement and motivational vigor and can be rational-
ized in any system in which there is an inherent opportunity cost
to performing an action (Niv et al., 2007). If the average return is
judged high by a Pavlovian system, then it makes sense to invest
more effort in instrumental actions, as seen in general Pavlovian-
instrumental transfer.
Fourth, andmore specifically, Pavlovian values can selectively
guide choices among different options presented simulta-
neously. Pavlovian cue value reflects a state-based homeostatic
quantity that reflects physiological need. Thus, the utility of food
declines as one becomes sated, or the utility of shelter is re-
duced on a fine, warm day. This information can be used to judge
the specific utilities in situations in which many courses of action
exist, as is demonstrated by sensory-specific satiety. Indeed,
one of the paradigms (devaluation) that has been particularly in-
structive in dissociating different action systems draws on the
fact that habit-based learning systems are unable to access spe-
cific value-related information without experiencing outcomes
and relearning actions (Balleine, 1992).
The Role of the Amygdala
Pavlovian Learning
The amygdala is widely recognized as one of the principle brain
structures, along with the striatum, associated with Pavlovian
learning (Gallagher and Chiba, 1996; Klu¨ver and Bucy, 1939;
LeDoux, 2000a; Maren and Quirk, 2004; Murray, 2007). Broadly,
it consists of two functionally and anatomically distinct compo-
nents, namely those that are affiliated with the central and baso-
lateral nuclei. Both are heavily connected with extensive cortical
and subcortical regions, consistent with a capacity to influence
diverse neural systems (Amaral and Price, 1984).
Early theories on the role of the amygdala centered on fear
(Weiskrantz, 1956), in light of the discovery that it acts as a critical
seat of Pavlovian aversive conditioning (Maren, 2005; Quirk
et al., 1995). More specifically, many elegant experiments have
demonstrated that the basolateral amygdala, byway of its exten-
sive afferent input from sensory cortical areas, is critical for form-
ing cue-outcome associations and that the central nucleus is
critical for mediating conditioned responses, by way of its pro-
jections to mid-brain and brainstem autonomic and arousal cen-
ters (Kapp et al., 1992). In what became known as the ‘‘serial
model’’ of amygdala function, the basolateral amygdala is
thought to learn associations, with direct projections to centralamygdala engaging the latter to execute appropriate responses
(LeDoux, 2000b).
In subsequent years, several key findings have emerged that
have enriched this picture. First, the amygdala has been found
to be critically involved in appetitive learning, in a similar (though
not identical) way to its involvement in aversive learning (Baxter
andMurray, 2002). Second, the central and basolateral nuclei of-
ten operate in parallel as well as in series. This is thought to sub-
serve dissociable components of learning, whereby the central
nucleus mediates more general affective, preparatory condition-
ing, with the basolateral nuclei mediating more consummatory,
value-specific, conditioning (Balleine and Killcross, 2006; Cardi-
nal et al., 2002). Third, rather than just executing Pavlovian re-
sponses, connections of both central and basolateral amygdala
with other areas, such as the striatum and prefrontal cortex, are
critical for integrating Pavlovian information with other decision-
making systems (Cardinal et al., 2002).
The Acquisition of Value
Single-neuron recording studies have identified neurons that en-
code the excitatory Pavlovian value of rewards and punishments
as well as neurons that encode salient predictions independently
of valence (Belova et al., 2007; Paton et al., 2006). Values can
also be inhibitory, as a consequence of the opponent relation-
ship between appetitive and aversive systems. Such opponency
comes in two forms: that related to the omission of an expected
motivational stimulus (Konorski, 1967) and that related to the off-
set of a tonic motivational stimulus (Solomon and Corbit, 1974).
Notably, the amygdala is implicated in encoding both (Belova
et al., 2007; Rogan et al., 2005; Seymour et al., 2005) .
Behavioral models of Pavlovian learning suggest that values
are acquired in a manner that depends on the discrepancy be-
tween predicted and actual outcomes (Rescorla and Wagner,
1972), and such prediction-error-based learning rules have ac-
cumulated significant biological support in another structure
strongly implicated in Pavlovian learning, namely the striatum.
This is the case for both appetitive learning, thought to be guided
by dopaminergic projections from the ventral tegmental area in
the midbrain (Nakahara et al., 2004; Satoh et al., 2003; Schultz
et al., 1997), and aversive learning, evidenced in humans by
fMRI (Jensen et al., 2007; Seymour et al., 2004). In both cases,
the nature of learning follows a class of updating algorithm
(called temporal difference models) that bootstrap value predic-
tions using temporal prediction errors and learn using both pos-
itive and negative prediction errors. This provides a flexible
mechanism to learn values ideally suited to environments with
delayed and uncertain outcomes.
The algorithmic nature of value learning in the amygdala is less
clear. Human fMRI studies have suggested that aversive Pavlov-
ian values are acquired in amygdala in a dynamic fashion consis-
tent with prediction-error-based models (Glascher and Buchel,
2005; Yacubian et al., 2006), and prediction errors occurring at
the time of outcome have been reported. A recent single-neuron
study of probabilistic appetitive and aversive conditioning in
monkeys has shown that separate neuronal populations encode
valence-specific, probabilistic, value-related signals (i.e., modu-
lated by outcome uncertainty) (Belova et al., 2007). This study
also found activity in keeping with a mirrored opponent pattern,
in which some neurons coded both reward and omittedNeuron 58, June 12, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 665
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played a full prediction error pattern, suggesting that learning
might be driven by a temporal prediction error signal arising
from elsewhere.
There are other reasons for thinking that the Pavlovian pro-
cesses seen in amygdala are not the same as those seen in stria-
tum, and one of the most significant reasons relates to the rep-
resentation of negative prediction errors (Redish et al., 2007).
In particular, aversive extinction (in which aversive outcomes
are omitted) is known to be mediated by active learning that in-
volves inputs from medial prefrontal cortex, in contrast to the
more direct acquisition of excitatory values (Maren and Quirk,
2004; Milad andQuirk, 2002). Such extinctionmemories are eas-
ily ‘‘forgotten’’ or disrupted by procedures such as reinstatement
and are sensitive to reconsolidation (Duvarci et al., 2006). This
aversively biased asymmetry endows amygdala-based Pavlov-
ian values with the same sort of ‘‘safety-first’’ encoding that re-
flects the affective hardwiring of unconditioned stimuli. Thus, it
is possible that the temporal-difference-based mechanisms of
Pavlovian value learning in striatum reflect a mechanism that
may be to a certain extent distinguishable and perhaps compu-
tationally more flexible than that implemented in amygdala, but
with both using prediction errors.
These differences may extend to the way in which Pavlovian
values influence decision making. Despite early models, it is un-
clear whether a striatal dopamine system exploits a learning
mechanism (for example, actor-critic) that directly utilizes Pav-
lovian predictions (or their errors) for action learning (Daw,
2007; Morris et al., 2006; Roesch et al., 2007; Samejima et al.,
2005), which would be necessary for Pavlovian effects on
choices, as seen in conditioned reinforcement, to have direct ac-
cess to actions values. Accordingly, this focuses attention else-
where to determine the components of a coordinated system
that mediates Pavlovian-instrumental interactions and on exper-
imental studies that attempt to disrupt them.
Pavlovian-Instrumental Interactions in Animals
There is good evidence that the amygdala yields Pavlovian
values to instrumental action systems, and indeed, central and
basolateral amygdala appear to mediate distinct types of inter-
action. For instance, Killcross et al. (1997) took rats with either
central or basolateral lesions, first trained them in a Pavlovian
conditioning procedure, and subsequently tested them in an in-
strumental procedure in which actions led to presentation of the
Pavlovian cue. Central nucleus lesioned animals displayed a def-
icit in the nonspecific suppression of instrumental responding
(conditioned suppression) produced by the cue, whereas baso-
lateral amygdala lesioned animals exhibited a deficit in biasing
instrumental choices away from an action that produced the
cue (conditioned punishment). In another example, Corbit and
Balleine, using a selective satiation procedure for instrumental
actions that led to different rewards, demonstrated that central
nucleus lesions (previously implicated in Pavlovian-instrumental
transfer; Hall et al., 2001; Holland and Gallagher, 2003) selec-
tively impaired general forms of Pavlovian-instrumental transfer
but that specific forms were selectively impaired with basolateral
amygdala lesions (Corbit and Balleine, 2005). Such dissociation
is borne out in other paradigms. The central nucleus has been
shown to be critical for contextual conditioning (Selden et al.,666 Neuron 58, June 12, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.1991), conditioned approach (Hitchcott and Phillips, 1998), and
conditioned orienting (Holland et al., 2002a), whereas the baso-
lateral amygdala has been shown to be critical for reinforcer re-
valuation (Balleine et al., 2003; Hatfield et al., 1996; Malkova
et al., 1997), conditioned reinforcement (Cador et al., 1989;
Hitchcott and Phillips, 1998), and second-order conditioning
(Burns et al., 1993; Hatfield et al., 1996).
These and other results (Blair et al., 2005; Ostlund and Bal-
leine, 2008; Wilensky et al., 2000) suggest that the basolateral
amygdala encodes specific value-related outcome information,
such as that modulated by satiety. The anatomical connections
that may subserve this have been elucidated in a series of ele-
gant experiments on conditioned potentiation of feeding. In
this paradigm, Pavlovian cues paired with food when individuals
were hungry can motivate sated animals to eat beyond satiety.
Rats with lesions of the basolateral, but not central, amygdala
do not show the characteristic potentiation of feeding normally
seen when the Pavlovian cues are presented (Holland et al.,
2001, 2002b). This effect depends on connectivity with hypothal-
amus and orbitomedial prefrontal cortex (Petrovich et al., 2002,
2005) but not striatum or lateral orbitofrontal cortex (McDannald
et al., 2005). Indeed, a wealth of other experiments have con-
firmed the importance of amygdala-OFC connections in mediat-
ing the impact of outcome-specific value representations on
choice (Baxter et al., 2000; Baxter and Browning, 2007; Ostlund
and Balleine, 2007; Paton et al., 2006; Saddoris et al., 2005;
Schoenbaum et al., 2003; Stalnaker et al., 2007).
Amygdala connectivity with nucleus accumbens mediates
a number of other Pavlovian influences on action. First, autosh-
aping and higher-order conditioned approaches depend on the
integrity of basolateral amygdala and nucleus accumbens and
their interconnections (Parkinson et al., 2000, 2002; Setlow
et al., 2002). This may be an important mediator of the Pavlovian
impulsivity seen in paradigms such as negative automainte-
nance (Dayan et al., 2006; Williams andWilliams, 1969). Second,
lesions of the core and shell of the nucleus accumbens disrupt
specific and general forms of Pavlovian-instrumental transfer,
respectively (Corbit et al., 2001).
Decision Making in Humans
The extent to which behavioral and anatomical findings from ro-
dents can be translated to humans (and primates) is an important
and open issue, because experimental data (in decision-making
tasks) on the latter are more scant. Human patients with amyg-
dala damage are impaired in decision-making tasks involving
risk and uncertainty, as are patients with ventromedial prefrontal
damage (Bechara et al., 1999). Using fMRI, Hampton and col-
leagues have shown that patients with amygdala lesions have
impaired outcome representations for instrumental choices in
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Hampton et al., 2007), an area
known to be critical for learning action-outcome contingencies
in instrumental learning (Bechara et al., 2000; Hampton et al.,
2006; Kim et al., 2006), as it is in rats (Coutureau et al., 2000). Ac-
cordingly, theamygdala-medial prefrontal pathwaymaybeacrit-
ical route by which stimulus-specific outcome information is
integrated with more sophisticated, goal-directed actions.
Indeed, many animal results have parallels with human
experiments (Delgado et al., 2006; Phelps and LeDoux,
2005). For instance, an amygdala contribution to human
Neuron
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context of an appetitive conditioning paradigm (Talmi et al.,
2008). Amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex are both implicated
in specific representations of outcome value in a similar manner
to animals (Gottfried et al., 2003), and this circuit may underlie
aspects of choice studied in behavioral economics. For exam-
ple, both areas are involved in using previous experiences of
regret to bias future decisions (regret avoidance): whereas the
orbitofrontal cortex appears important for representing the neg-
ative motivational value of regret, the amygdala appears more
specifically involved in biasing future decisions (i.e., learning)
(Coricelli et al., 2005). And consistent with other parallels, the
amygdala has been shown to have a central role in biasing
choice in the framing effect to cause risk aversion in positive con-
texts (De Martino et al., 2006; Figure 3), and in economic trans-
actions (selling objects) causing loss aversion (Weber et al.,
2007).
The role of the amygdala further extends to other aspects of
economic uncertainty. Humans, in general, have an aversion to
selecting options to which the probabilities determining the out-
comes are unknown (ambiguous), compared to options in which
they are known (risk), even when the overall expected value of
each is equivalent. By directly comparing choices made under
risk or ambiguity, Hsu and colleagues (Hsu et al., 2005) have
shown that amygdala activity predicts subjects’ decisions to
opt for less-ambiguous options. Intriguingly, lesions of the cen-
tral nucleus of the amygdala in the rat appear to impair the in-
crease in learning due to increases in cue-outcome associability
(uncertainty) (Holland and Gallagher, 1993). Associability, being
theoretically aligned to ambiguity by the fact that both drive
learning (in contrast to risk), is thought to control learning via
the neuromodulators acetylcholine and norepinephrine (Yu and
Dayan, 2005), midbrain sources of which (nucleus basalis and lo-
cus coeruleus, respectively) both receive substantial input from
the central nucleus.
A Role in Social Decision Making?
One of the most notable findings from human fMRI studies is the
exquisite sensitivity of the amygdala to motivational information
provided by faces, including to complex social information such
as moral status, trust, and suspicion (Adolphs et al., 1998;
Adolphs and Spezio, 2006; Calder and Young, 2005; Moll
et al., 2005; Singer et al., 2004; Winston et al., 2002). How
such rich motivational information can be used to influence
choice, both in terms of relatively basic hardwired responses
and integration with more goal-directed social decision making,
is little understood, but one possibility is that Pavlovian mecha-
nisms are involved. Choice in social interaction harbors a level
of complexity that makes it unique among natural decision-mak-
ing problems, because outcome probabilities depend on the un-
observable internal state of the other individual, which incorpo-
rates their motives (intentions). Because most interactions are
repeated, optimal learning requires subjects to generate amodel
of another individuals’ behavior, and their model of our behavior,
and so on. These iteratively nested levels of complexity render
many social decision-making problems computationally intrac-
table (Lee, 2006).
Pavlovian learningmechanismsmay offer help. First, by invok-
ing inherent prosocial tendencies (e.g., empathy and variousFigure 3. The Framing Effect and the Amygdala
Reproduced from De Martino et al. (2006).
(A) Behavioral frame biases. Subjects chose between a risky gamble and
a sure option in a forced-choice paradigm in which each option had the
same expected value, but the sure option was presented in either a positive
frame (in terms of winning) or a negative frame (in terms of losing). Subjects
bias their choices toward gambling in the ‘‘loss’’ frame, consistent with the
well-described frame effect, in which negative frames cause people to be-
come more risk seeking. Error bars denote SEM.
(B) BOLD responses. Activity in the amygdala strongly correlates with the di-
rection of the frame bias (choice 3 frame interaction) at the time of choice.
(C) Amygdala activity. BOLD signal change as a function of choice and frame,
displaying how activity follows the behavioral direction of the frame bias. Error
bars denote SEM.Neuron 58, June 12, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 667
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Reviewforms of altruism), Pavlovianmechanismsmay prime reciprocity,
to the mutual advantage of cooperators (Seymour et al., 2007).
Second, associative value learningmechanisms have the capac-
ity to associate positive and negative outcomes across individ-
uals and circumstances, and estimates of trustworthiness pro-
vide a way of generalizing prosocial tendencies in other
individuals and across different types of social interaction (Axel-
rod and Hamilton, 1981; King-Casas et al., 2005; Trivers, 1971).
As an approximate inference about a hidden variable, namely
cooperative reciprocity, in the brain of others, it is a key determi-
nant of future outcomes that may obviate the requirement to
model precisely the complexity inherent in repeated social inter-
actions (Kraines and Kraines, 1993). Indeed, simple associative
learning models have proved remarkably good at predicting be-
havior in human game theoretic tasks (Erev and Roth, 1998,
2007) and that the amygdala may utilize such approximations
is hinted at by very recent studies that havemanipulated trust us-
ing oxytocin (Baumgartner et al., 2008).
Conclusions
Clearly, there are several distinct mechanisms by which the
amygdala plays a key role not just in simple conditioning but
in complex decision making. Through Pavlovian learning, the
amygdala can evoke conditioned responses that reflect an evo-
lutionarily acquired action set capable of exerting a dominant ef-
fect on choice. Second, amygdala-based Pavlovian values are
exploited by instrumental (habit-based and goal-directed) learn-
ingmechanisms in specificways, through connectivity with other
brain regions such as the striatum and prefrontal cortex.
We have argued that such Pavlovian integration is a theoreti-
cally reasonable strategy for improving and optimizing choice
outcomes. How this relates to traditional notions of emotion is
an open question, because definitions of emotion are often char-
acteristically vague. Whereas there may be much more to emo-
tion than that captured by innate values and responses and their
acquisition in Pavlovian conditioning, most modern accounts of
emotion contain these processes as a central theme (Dolan,
2002; LeDoux, 2000a; Rolls, 1998). Thus, the popular notion
that emotional mechanisms are irrational may be ill-conceived,
arising as an artifact of the fact that it is only when the influence
of emotional (Pavlovian) mechanisms is suboptimal are we prone
to be aware of their operation.
Lastly, there are notable parallels between the sorts of deci-
sion-making tasks well-studied in behavioral economics and
the paradigms used by learning theorists, whose subjects are of-
ten nonhuman. Not only can neuroscientists learnmuch from the
ingenious paradigms of behavioral economists, but the latter
may benefit from the insights into the basic structure of decision
making, and its subtle complexities, yielded by neuroscience.
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